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This article explores the adjustment of wage bargaining institutions to international trade in 
Germany. Embracing IPE as opposed to CPE lenses yields a novel interpretation of change 
in the institution of wage bargaining. Export dependence of a sector, we argue, has 
destabilizing effects for industry-wide bargaining by sparking an intra-sectoral cleavage 
between domestic- and export-oriented enterprises. Specifically, the greater the degree of 
export dependence of a sector, the greater the degree to which domestic-oriented enterprises 
within that sector will abandon collective bargaining. We also explain how work-place 
employee representation through works councils mitigates this effect, such that the presence 
of works councils helps domestically-oriented firms to hold to collective bargaining 
agreements in the face of a sector’s deepening exposure to export markets. These claims find 
empirical support in the history of labor-relations developments in the metal industry and, 
especially, in extensive analysis of a cross-section of establishments. Our findings attribute 
major responsibility to the firms driving globalization for undermining collective bargaining 
institutions, and suggest that economic globalization is a cause of dualization. In all, the 
article provides fresh ammunition for a version of globalization-induced institutional 
conversion.  
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This article explores the impact of Germany’s insertion in the international division 
of labor as a stellar exporter on industry-wide collective bargaining and discusses the 
implications for labor market dualization and institutional convergence. Comparative 
political economists have downplayed the effects of economic globalization on bargaining 
institutions, focusing on domestic factors instead. Papers by Thelen (2000) and Silvia and 
Schroeder (2007) engage arguments about globalization and institutional change in wage 
bargaining, yet neither considers export dependence as a determinant of institutional change. 
And whatever the origins of the erosion of collective bargaining institutions, scholars point 
to tension within employers’ associations in the form of a small/large firm cleavage. A 
different research tradition argues that openness leads to more social spending (Cameron 
1978; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998). But globalization appears no longer to be associated 
with the compensation mechanism of welfare states in open economies the way it long was 
(Busemeyer 2009), suggesting that governments find it increasingly difficult to compensate 
the losers of globalization. To the extent that collectively-agreed working conditions 
constitute welfare compensation and encompassing bargaining institutions foster 
compensatory policies, we have a new effect of globalization in driving labor market 
dualization by way of how export dependence leads domestic-oriented enterprises to quit 
employers’ associations. Yet the literature on the politics of dualization has neglected the 
effects of globalization other than immigration (Rueda 2007; King and Rueda 2008; 
Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). 
We focus on change in perhaps the most distinctive institutional pillars of 
“coordinated” market economies in the flagship country of “organized” capitalism (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Höpner 2007). We submit that to understand contemporary adjustments in 
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industry-wide wage bargaining requires a systematic analysis of how export dependence 
impacts wage settlements and collective bargaining coverage, that is, the extent to which 
firms in a sector adhere to collectively-agreed (wage) norms. Specifically, we argue that the 
greater the degree of export dependence of a sector, the greater the degree to which domestic-
oriented enterprises within that sector abandon collective bargaining. The effects of export 
dependence operate by and large via two channels. First, exporting brings economies of scale 
and learning effects to those firms that export, enhancing their productivity and profitability. 
Second, short-term economic gains associated with export upswings in net export-competing 
sectors tend to push wage settlements up. All in all, export-oriented firms can afford the 
collectively-agreed wages that take account of a sector’s average productivity whereas 
domestic-oriented firms cannot. But there is a twist, highlighting a locus of political agency 
in responses to globalization. The effects of a sector’s export dependence on the likelihood 
to follow collective agreements are contingent on workplace institutional condition: the 
presence of works councils help domestic-oriented enterprises to hold to collective 
agreements in the face of greater export dependence of a sector, because establishments with 
works councils respond to trade openness by making more flexibility compromises that allow 
these firms to reduce costs and remain profitable.    
Our study combines in-depth historical analysis of the metalworking sector with 
large-N analysis of a cross-section of enterprises in the full gamut of sectors as pertains to 
the German economy. Export dependence and collective bargaining in metalworking feature 
central stage in our analysis of institutional change in wage bargaining in Germany because 
of the sector’s pattern-setting function within the system of industrial relations. Over-time 
analysis of industrial relations developments in metalworking suggests that wage movements 
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were responsive to short-term fluctuations in sector’s export dependence over the period 
1984-2007, and that strong annual export performance adversely affected collective 
bargaining coverage via higher settlements over the period 1994-2007. And cross-sectional 
analysis of establishment-level data suggests that higher industry-level export orientation 
reduces the incidence to follow collective agreements among domestic-oriented firms, but 
that the presence of works councils tends to mute this effect. 
These findings have implications for the politics of institutional change in wage 
bargaining and for labor market dualization. They point to globalization as a major driving 
force behind change, though not how previous scholarship has thought. Export dependence 
of a sector has destabilizing effects for industry-wide bargaining by sparking an intra-sectoral 
split between domestic-oriented enterprises, on the one hand, and export-oriented firms, on 
the other, with the divisive pressures running partly via wage bargaining. As export firms 
fuel a sector’s export dependence, globalization does not make of export firms just the “good 
guys,” but the “bad guys.” And the differential ability to exploit globalization pits insiders 
against outsiders, not outsiders at the margins of the system, but those who do not work in 
firms that enjoy the traction of the German export powerhouse. In short, exposure to export 
dependence drives dualization, which can also be conceived as a particular form of (rising) 
inequality. 
The analysis also sheds light on the discussion of the role of globalization in leading 
to institutional convergence among advanced industrial economies. Comparative political 
economy (CPE) and, especially, the “varieties-of-capitalism” (VofC) approach have been 
traditionally hostile to the notion of convergence. Within the VofC literature, economic 
globalization is cast in a light that reinforces existing institutional differences rather than 
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leading to institutional convergence. Regarding wage setting, globalization should act as an 
institutional enforcer as firms compete by using comparative institutional advantage.1 Our 
findings do not necessarily suggest a globalization-driven cross-national convergence in 
institutional form, but they are consistent with a convergence in institutional functioning 
along a common neoliberal trajectory of change yielding similar outcomes (Baccaro and 
Howell 2011). Clearly, industry-wide (and coordinated) bargaining remains a reality in 
contemporary Germany, but it is less and less encompassing and egalitarian as a result of 
export dependence. Yet, as we shall see, there is some evidence that under the surface of 
stability employer coordination is on the wane. 
The article is organized in four sections. The first section highlights blind spots in the 
literature and offers an alternative account of the causal chain linking globalization and 
institutional change in wage bargaining. The second explores the relationship between export 
dependence and wage bargaining in the metalworking sector. The third section investigates 
the effects of export dependence for collective bargaining institutions in metalworking and 
in a large cross-section of enterprises. A final section concludes. 
 
1. Related Research and Argument 
 
Employers’ associations are critical organizations in many advanced industrialized 
economies. They negotiate collective agreements with unions at various levels that address 
working conditions, including wages and hours. In Germany, collective bargaining occurs 
mainly at the industry-level and is coordinated across the economy through the wage 
leadership of the metalworking’s union IG Metall.2 Industry-level bargaining does not imply 
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universal coverage of collective agreements because only firms organized in employers’ 
associations are obliged to provide collectively-agreed standards to employees.3 As one of 
the anchors of coordinated market economies, encompassing bargaining is important because 
it dovetail with low inequality (Rueda and Pontusson 2000) and with high-wage, high-quality 
production in international markets (Hall and Soskice 2001). Due to institutional 
complementarities, the erosion of sectoral bargaining may lead to the demise of organized 
political economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Despite extensive research on centralized systems of collective bargaining, the 
comparative political economy and globalization literatures provide only limited guidance as 
to the intricacies of industrial-relations developments in an open economy. Most studies of 
collective bargaining outcomes (Wallerstein 1990; Hall and Franzese 1998; Mares 2006; 
Baccaro and Simoni 2010) and institutions (Hassel 1999; Blyth 2001; Kohaut and Schnabel 
2003; Culpepper 2008) focus on domestic political-economic, institutional or ideational 
explanations. Others find that economic globalization does not matter much for wage-setting 
institutions (Wallerstein 1998; Hassel and Schulten 1998; Streeck 2009). A prominent line 
of research has suggested how heighted economic competition produced inter-sectoral 
cleavages among employers about the desirability of nationwide centralization, fuelling 
downward shifts in the locus of bargaining (Iversen 1996; Swenson and Pontusson 2000). 
Still others have considered how globalization might hollow out industry-level collective 
bargaining by spurring an intra-sectoral cleavage among employers, but where the causal 
mechanisms remain contested and poorly tested across time and space (Thelen and van 
Wijnbergen 2003; Silvia and Schroeder 2007). 
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While focusing similarly on domestic factors, studies of wage bargaining and of 
bargaining institutions in Germany tend to be compartmentalized or to concentrate on one 
direction of the interaction—namely how institutions affect wage developments, not the other 
way around. Scholars have examined the interaction between social policy and the wage 
strategies of unions, where welfare state expansion was premised on wage restraint (Crouch 
and Pizzorno 1978), but where welfare state maturation, via changes in the level and 
composition of welfare commitments, has reduced the incentives for wage moderation 
(Mares 2006). Along similar lines, research has shown that IG Metall has been willing to 
forego generous wage increases to finance working time reduction and early retirement 
(Bispinck 1995; Streeck 2001). Among the scholars exploring the consequences of labor 
market institutions for economic performance, some have considered how centralization and 
coordination affect wages (Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Soskice 1990). Also, the 
independence of the central bank has been instrumental in moderating IG Metall’s wage 
claims (Streeck 1994; Hall and Franzese 1998). Recent research identifies other 
organizational factors, such as internal governance processes within union confederations 
involving democratic ratification of collective bargaining contracts, which, in isolation or in 
combination with coordination, dampen wage growth (Baccaro and Simoni 2010). 
Prominent explanations of institutional change in wage bargaining include employer 
dissatisfaction with the lack of flexibility in one-size-fits-all central agreements (Schroeder 
and Ruppert 1996:323),4 German unification (Silvia 1997; Turner 1998), deindustrialization 
and the accompanying change in firm size (Hassel 1999), and restructuring via vertical 
disintegration (Doellgast and Greer 2007). Where globalization is considered as a cause of 
change, the conclusion is that weaker unions resulting from higher unemployment and 
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organizational decline among capital and labor account for pressurized collective bargaining 
(Hassel and Schulten 1998). Research on large firms has shown that plant-level pacts for 
employment and competitiveness have been accompanied by greater flexibility of central 
contracts which helped stabilize the institution of wage bargaining (Rehder 2003; Streeck and 
Rehder 2003). The latest entry in the debate makes the case for endogeneous, self-
undermining change (Streeck 2009). Whatever the cause, the CPE literature is virtually 
unanimous that a split between small- and medium-sized enterprises, on the one hand, and 
large firms, on the other, lies behind the erosion of German wage bargaining institutions 
(Schroeder and Ruppert 1996; Völkl 1998; Thelen 2000; Hassel and Rehder 2001; Zimmer 
2002; Streeck 2009). 
Two papers addressing globalization and collective bargaining institutions deserve 
close scrutiny. Thelen (2000; Thelen and van Wijnbergen 2003) is rightly credited for 
spelling out the feedback effect of wage negotiations for industry-wide bargaining in an open 
economy. Heightened competition fuels the international diffusion of innovative 
organizational practices (another “aspect of globalization” in Thelen’s terminology) that 
gives rise to a new production regime characterized by tightly coupled networks of suppliers 
and assemblers. Interdependence increases employers’ vulnerability to industrial stoppages 
because they fear losing contracts to domestic (that is, located in other bargaining districts) 
and foreign competitors. Relying on cooperative relations among and within firms for 
success, employers turn reluctant to use the lockout. Knowing this, the unions demand higher 
wages. When push comes to shove, large firms prefer to buy labor peace by paying more 
expensive settlements they can afford due to productivity gains reaped via the introduction 
of flexible working-time arrangements. Small enterprises cannot afford them because 
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workplace flexibility is less practicable in small than in large firms. As employers’ 
associations yield to large firm pressures, small enterprises express discontent by voting with 
their feet, setting in motion a vicious circle of exits from employers’ associations as the 
defection of small firms unwilling to pay high settlements rises the odds of remaining 
employers to sign an expansive wage deal in the next round. 
Based on analysis of compensation data over four decades, Silvia and Schroeder 
(2007) show that annual wage changes in metalworking grew smaller over time. 
Accordingly, they reject Thelen’s thesis that organized labor contributed to the cost pressures 
that led small and medium-sized enterprises to leave the metal employers’ associations as the 
economy grew more interdependent. They argue instead that global price pressures imposed 
by assemblers on suppliers, followed by the change in firm size toward small enterprises and 
the poor provision of employer-association services to small firms account for the dwindling 
membership density of employers’ associations. In sum, while acknowledging the small/large 
firm cleavage, they highlight a new cleavage involving supplier-assembler relations along 
the production chain. This directly contradicts Thelen and van Wijnbergen (2003:874-75) 
who expect supplier firms operating in tightly coupled, just-in-time production networks to 
share assemblers’ interest in uninterrupted production and hence to stay in employers’ 
associations.5 Although these studies have considerably increased our understanding of 
changing bargaining institutions under openness, their disagreement over what facet of 
globalization matters, what cleavage globalization nurtures, and whether the effect of 
globalization runs via union-led wage bargaining suggests that they have not exhausted the 
topic. 
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This article offers a new interpretation of globalization and industrial-relations 
developments in Germany, one that takes into account the full power of the German export 
wonder machine. Empirically, the paper improves on earlier studies by measuring export 
dependence, collectively-set wage increases and wage bargaining coverage in metalworking 
over time,6 and by exploiting large-N cross-sectional data comprising a range of enterprise-
level information including size, degree of export orientation, and decision to follow 
collective bargaining agreements.7 Our contribution adopts IPE-lenses to a subject almost 
exclusively studied within CPE. It is noteworthy that the entries to the debates reviewed 
above come from comparative politics or country experts who tend to share a neo-
institutionalist approach and write within the VofC approach and its dual convergence thesis. 
Where cross-fertilization occurred, the treatment of globalization is most often 
unsatisfactory. For example, the global price pressures in Silvia and Schroeder’s (2007) 
account are loosely defined, preventing us from disentangling the different sources of global 
competitive pressures. Hay (2004:247-48) perceptively noted the VofC’s inadequate 
handling of globalization as a causal process, concluding that “[t]his surely suggests the need 
to examine the inputs side of the equation in a rather more detailed and empirically exhaustive 
fashion.” This article provides just that.  
Regarding wage developments under collective bargaining in the export-oriented 
German economy, we consider wage bargaining involving a net export-competing sector 
(that is, exports minus imports as a share of sector production>0). The specific-factors model 
of international trade predicts workers in sectors that make intensive use of the abundant 
(scarce) factor to benefit (lose) from trade in the short run, net of individual’s skill level (Alt, 
Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski 1996). The welfare of employed workers is tied to 
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the overall fortunes of the sector in which they are employed, with capital and labor gaining 
(losing) from trade liberalization in a net export-competing (import-competing) sector 
(Davidson and Matusz 2004:10). A sector’s net exports (imports) captures the implications 
of trade for particular producer-groups where inter-sectoral factor mobility is limited, and 
taps partly into revealed comparative advantage (comparative disadvantage)(Gilligan 1997; 
Hiscox 1999; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Accordingly, we expect different politics 
surrounding collective wage bargaining in net export- and import-competing sectors, with 
trade unions likely to pursue a more militant wage strategy in the former than in the latter. 
This logic should extend to short-term changes in the level of a sector’s net export-
competition because of short-term economic gains and losses associated with the 
strengthening and the weakening of the sector’s comparative advantage position, 
respectively. Specifically, in net exporting-competing sectors such as metalworking, we 
expect short-term economic gains associated with upswings in export markets to benefit the 
wage position of workers via higher wage settlements, but we expect short-term downswings 
in export success to contain the negotiated wage increment (Hypothesis 1). 
Regarding institutional change in wage bargaining in an open economy, we consider 
the effects of export orientation on enterprise’s decision to follow collective agreements. 
These effects operate mainly via two mechanisms. First, exporting brings economies of scale 
and learning effects, enhancing firm productivity and profitability (Frieden and Rogowski 
1996:39; Bernard and Wagner 1997; Wagner 2007).8 Exporting enlarges the available market 
by opening up sales opportunities abroad. As exporting firms produce more of a same good, 
manufacturing costs per unit decrease due to economies of scale. The larger the scale of 
output associated with the enlarged market, the larger the economic benefits accruing to 
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exporting firms (Milner 1997; Chase 2003). Exporting also provides expert information from 
international customers and suppliers about a wide variety of factors such as market 
conditions, technological and process improvements that improve the post-entry performance 
of export starters (Frieden and Rogowski 1996:39). The knowledge and networks so built 
ought to be cumulative, implying productivity gaps not only between exporters and non-
exporters, but also between firms more or less exposed to export markets (Wagner 2007). 
Further, firms participating in foreign markets are exposed to fiercer competition and 
accordingly need to improve faster than firms who sell their goods domestically only. Facing 
competition abroad creates incentives for technological progress, management efficiency and 
greater capacity utilization, all of which contribute to output and productivity growth 
(Bernard and Wagner 1997:135). In short, as export markets enhance the role of scale 
economies in production and generate learning effects, we expect divisions within sectors 
among domestic- and export-oriented firms to grow. 
The second mechanism relates to the regime shift in collective bargaining toward the 
economic performance of that part of the sector that is export-oriented (H1). By seeking to 
capture their legitimate share of rents associated with expanding exports in net export-
oriented sectors, the unions target economic conditions in the profitable exporting firms, 
which in turn is detrimental to the domestic-oriented firms’ ability to pay the collectively-
agreed wage rates. Whereas export-oriented firms can afford the collectively-set wages that 
take into account average sector productivity, domestic-oriented firms cannot because 
average sector productivity factors in productivity gains associated with export success. Due 
to bargaining coordination via the pace-setting function of the metal sector, such regime shift 
should spill over not only to other net export-competing sectors, but also at least partially to 
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net import-competing sectors. The divisive pressures in a sector should be stronger in sectors 
with high levels of exposure to exports, reflecting an accumulation of strong annual export 
performance over time that unions do not fail to exploit. In short, higher export orientation 
of a sector should decrease the likelihood to follow collective bargaining agreements among 
domestic-oriented enterprises in that sector (Hypothesis 2).9 
The intuition motivating our expectation that workplace institutional condition 
mediates how globalization affects enterprise-level decision to sign on to collective 
agreements originates in scholarship on how globalization affects national polities which 
acknowledges that national institutions mediate globalization’s effects (Garrett 1998; Swank 
2002). Works councils provide establishment-level employee representation in many EU 
countries where they are protected by law. In Germany, they are authorized (but not 
automatic) in establishments with five permanent employees, hence they may exist regardless 
of whether a firm is covered by a collective agreement. They negotiate over issues that fall 
under co-determination rights, including the organization of work, working-time 
arrangements, and atypical contracts. They are formally independent from but often have 
close ties with unions, as the latter have historically mobilized rank-and-file members to run 
in works council elections with considerable success (Hassel 1999). 
Works councils may condition how globalization affects collective bargaining 
coverage for two reasons. First, workplace employee representation bodies aggregate the 
interests of employees and increase their capacities in negotiations relative to employers. This 
suggests that enterprises with works councils should have conditions more favorable to 
employees’ interests than enterprises without such worker organization. This is consistent 
with empirical evidence showing how employees represented by works councils fare better 
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than their unrepresented counterparts in terms of wages and collective bargaining coverage 
(Kohaut and Schnabel 2003; Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick 2010). 
Second, in the context of intensified global competition, works councils might engage 
in strategic behavior that trades off employment issues with high employee priorities against 
issues with low employee priorities. Employees are more divided about the benefits of 
flexibility than of job security. Against the backdrop of increased international competition 
and more opportunities for plant-level deviations from sectoral collective agreement 
standards since the early 1990s, works councils have engaged in concessions involving 
flexible working-time arrangements, atypical employment contracts, and variable pay in 
exchange for investment and/or employment guarantees (Hassel and Rehder 2001; 
Kurdelbusch 2002; Rehder 2003; Raess and Burgoon 2006). Recent research details such 
quid pro quo agreements across work-time issues, where enterprises with works councils 
facing increased trade and international investment trade off greater employment flexibility, 
such as temporary or fixed-term contracts and “balancing time accounts,” against the 
protection of employees’ standard weekly hours (Burgoon and Raess 2009). Such strategic 
bargaining might well extend to the wage position of workers and to collective agreements 
that protect wages and standard hours, given how wages and hours, just like job security, are 
more central to employee preferences than is flexibility. Inasmuch the effects of export 
dependence of a sector fall on domestic-oriented enterprises (H2), we expect the presence of 
works councils among those firms to moderate globalization’s tendency to decrease the odds 
of following collective agreements, because flexibility compromises allows them to reduce 
costs and remain profitable. In short, higher sector-level export orientation should less 
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substantially decrease domestic-oriented establishments’ likelihood to follow collective 
agreements when they have a works council than when they do not (Hypothesis 3). 
There is one caveat. The years in question were a time of production relocation. 
Globalization in the form of plant relocation resulted in some hollowing out of German 
production as well as declining overall costs due to stages of the production process being 
outsourced to Eastern Europe. Assuming that the proceeds from relocation are shared with 
the remaining workforce, we would expect a cleavage between firms engaged in international 
outsourcing and those that aren’t. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to test such a 
hypothesis.10 However, we know that small firms were less able to make use of relocation 
than large ones (DIHT 1993; DIHK 2003). And to the extent that outward FDI in a sector 
serves as a proxy for the degree of relocation, our quantitative analysis gets at this alternative 
explanation, imperfectly, by controlling for organization size and outward FDI.   
 
2. Export Dependence and Wage Bargaining in Metalworking 
 This section considers the globalization–wage bargaining nexus in metalworking, 
presumably an important intervening link to understand adjustments of industry-wide 
bargaining institutions to trade. Streeck (1994:126) has long surmised “just as the 
Bundesbank’s non-negotiable tight monetary policy, the international exposure of its 
industries forces IG Metall to moderate its wage demands.” Is such claim, reminiscent of 
broader neocorporatist arguments, born out in the data? 
 
2.1. Trends in Wage Settlements (1971-2007) 
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To assess the union’s contribution to costs via its wage bargaining strategy, we 
collected annual data on the wage increase agreed upon by IG Metall and Gesamtmetall in 
their (bi-) annual bargaining rounds from the early 1970s to the late 2000s.11 Using statistics 
on annual change in consumer prices, we compiled a measure of annual real wage increase. 
The pattern-setting function of the metalworking sector forces IG Metall to consider 
productivity growth for the economy as a whole (that is, total productivity) as a key parameter 
in its bargaining strategy (Streeck 1994). Figure 1 illustrates ten-year average increases in 
real wage and total productivity over the period 1971-2007.12 
[Figure 1 Here] 
Costs owing to collective wage bargaining grew larger over time. Taking into account 
that productivity in the 1990s is inflated due to the surge in Eastern German productivity after 
reunification, Figure 1 shows that the extent of wage moderation decreased in each 
successive decade since the 1970s (shown by the narrowing gap between the two lines as 
time passes). Assessing IG Metall’s wage strategy against its own goal yields a similar result: 
the incidence of redistributive bargaining (that is, nominal wage increment greater than the 
sum of inflation and productivity) grew over time with an inflection in the 1990s. Figure 1 
also shows that wage settlements remained below changes in total productivity (and far below 
productivity increases in metal) throughout the period—an indication of wage moderation. 
In short, whereas wage moderation characterizes the entire period 1971-2007, the 
extent of wage moderation declined over time.13 In a sense, IG Metall resisted employers’ 
calls to reduce wage costs better than expected as the sector grew more integrated into world 
markets. Our data hence lend support to Thelen’s thesis that wage costs have grown bigger 
in recent years as a consequence of wage bargaining. This is not to say that there has been a 
16 
 
linear trend of rising annual wage settlements. Fine-grained analysis reveals significant 
variation over time, such as low real wage increases in the early 1980s and 1990s, relatively 
high increments in the late 1980s and 1990s, but moderate hikes in 1997-1998 and 2000-
2001. The next section seeks to explain this sort of variation. 
 
2.2. Wage Determination under Collective Bargaining in an Open Economy 
Does globalization account for the movements in wage settlements in metalworking 
over the past decades? Using exports and production statistics from the Federal Statistical 
Office, we compiled a measure of annual change in export dependence (that is, exports in the 
sector as a share of sector production) from 1981 onward.14 This globalization measure is 
lagged two years due to context-specific reasons (see below) to take account of delays in 
negotiated responses to economic conditions.  
Correlation analysis provides a first impression of the pattern in the data. Figure 2 
shows the co-variation between lagged change in export dependence and real wage increase 
over the period 1984-2007. The two lines clearly move in tandem. The strength of the 
correlation is .61. The relationship is even stronger (.74) over the period 1994-2007 when 
economic globalization was arguably salient (for example, the “Standort-Deutschland” 
debate).15 These positive correlations are consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
We next turn to multivariate analysis of the determinants of wage settlements.16 The 
annual rate of real wage change is a continuous variable for which the estimator is OLS. 
Table 1 reports results for a range of percentage change regression models with change in 
export dependence as regressor. For the period 1984-2007, bivariate regression yields a 
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positive and statistically significant coefficient (column 1). Export dependence remains 
positive and significant in our baseline model that controls for change in total productivity 
and unemployment (column 2). This model performs well, accounting for 56 percent of the 
variance in wage increments. The full model, including economic growth and annual change 
in employment as additional controls, performs similarly (column 3). Finally, to test for time 
dependency, we re-estimate the baseline model by adding the lagged dependent variable on 
the right-hand-side (column 4). Whereas the controls perform in line with expectations, 
change in exports positively and significantly predicts wage increases. The size of the effect 
is fairly strong: moving from 0 to 4.6 percent of export growth (from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile) yields an annual real wage increase of 1.1 percent. The same models display even 
stronger results over the period 1994-2007. In sum, consistent with Hypothesis 1, wage 
bargaining in metal has been responsive to lagged change in export performance in the last 
quarter of a century. 
[Table 1 Here] 
The results are robust to a range of alternate estimations, including changing the 
control variables (for example, productivity in metal, unemployment levels), the time lags in 
the controls, and estimating nominal wage increases with annual change in consumer prices 
on the right-hand-side. However, the results are sensitive to a change in the lag of the 
independent variable. Taking an average of two- and one-year lags in exports change, we 
obtain a positive coefficient that borders significance level for most estimations. But the 
association does not hold when export dependence is lagged one-year. This is not surprising 
because the annual change in export share, unlike the annual level in sector’s export share, 
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varies greatly from year to year (Figure 2). It is therefore critical to identify the right time 
lag.  
In-depth knowledge of labor relations in the metal industry gained from extensive 
fieldwork and analysis of the organizational set-up of wage campaigns reveal that a two-year 
lag in the globalization variable is appropriate. Collective agreements are typically concluded 
in the first half of a given year t (IG Metall 2002). Although the metalworking union’s internal 
decision-making regarding wage claims is skewed toward the central board, bargaining 
commissions at the district level coordinate consultations among union members and shop 
stewards that inform central deliberations (Weiss and Schmidt 2000:150; IG Metall 2002). 
These consultations and the formulation of the initial wage claim occur in the year preceding 
the settlement (t-1). Documentary evidence shows that lagged export performance is a 
parameter on the mind of union leaders when debating the wage claim (at t-1): IG Metall’s 
internal position papers graphically depict and discuss trends in exports lagged one year—
hence lagged two years in relation to the wage settlement—alongside productivity, consumer 
prices, employment and economic growth (for example, IG Metall 2001). This suggests that 
lagged (t-2) export performance informs the union’s wage demands and likely affects the 
settlement level.17 
Further examination of the union’s decision-making process regarding wage claims 
adds credence to Hypothesis 1. As mentioned, bargaining commissions in each district 
coordinate extensive consultations. Works councils’ representatives from large, exporting 
firms dominate these commissions (Hassel and Kittel 2001:14; Carlin and Soskice 2009:72). 
Therefore, the wage increment is likely to be strongly influenced by economic conditions in 
those firms. 
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In short, although IG Metall wage bargaining has been responsive to changes in the 
sector’s export performance since 1984, steady export growth helped spur higher real wage 
increases on a yearly basis since 1994 (Figure 2). This provides a different construal of the 
“big victories” by organized labor than the one proposed by Thelen: the union merely 
captures its fair share of increased rents stemming from short-term gains of the sector’s 
expansion through exports. Accordingly, the two-year contract that sealed the real wage 
increases of 1.6 percent in 1995 and 2.2 percent in 1996—the empirical centerpiece of 
Thelen’s analysis—was neither excessive nor generous, but enabled by strong export growth 
in the preceding years (2.1 percent in 1993, 6.3 percent in 1994). This and other recent 
settlements thus appear to be instances where the union made legitimate and affordable wage 
claims in relation to employers in the export-oriented part of the sector.  
 
3. Export Dependence and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining 
The erosion of collective bargaining coverage is well documented. The decline in the 
metalworking employers’ association density has been staggering: the density of Western 
German employers’ associations in terms of employment fell from 75 to 55 percent between 
1977 and 2007.18 For West Germany as a whole, industry-level collective bargaining 
coverage decreased from 72 percent of employees to 63 between 1995 and 2001 (Kohaut and 
Schnabel 2003:199). We focus on West Germany because the decline in employers’ 
association membership has been much steeper and industrial relations developments 
different in the East (Schroeder 2000). Rising globalization has coincided with declining 
coverage, but has the former caused the latter? 
 
20 
 
3.1. Evidence from Metalworking 
We explore whether change in sector’s export performance affects aggregate 
collective bargaining coverage and whether such effect runs via wage bargaining. This 
requires an empirical analysis in two steps. First, we estimate the total effect of globalization 
measure on collective agreement coverage. Second, we re-estimate the same relationship this 
time controlling for annual wage changes, which gives the direct effect of globalization on 
coverage. Lacking a reliable measure of the density of metalworking employers’ associations 
in terms of companies (theoretically our preferred measure), we use data on employment 
density instead. Given the less-than-ideal quality of this measure, we must be cautious about 
drawing any strong conclusions from this analysis.19 
Table 2 summarizes the main results for 1994-2007. Column 1 shows a negative and 
significant effect of change in exports on collective bargaining coverage, suggesting that an 
increase in exports reduces aggregate coverage. When we control for the annual change in 
wage (column 2), the globalization term, which shows the direct effect of change in export 
dependence on change in coverage, loses statistical significance. This implies that the effect 
of exports on collective agreement coverage works through the indirect effect exports have 
on the wage settlements. Columns 3-4 show that this pattern does not reflect serial correlation. 
Although firm-level data is required to find out what kind of companies left employers’ 
association, the finding that linkage between sectoral exports and wage bargaining has 
reduced aggregate coverage in recent years is consistent with the fact that the pressure to hold 
to collective agreement has fallen disproportionately on non-exporting firms, lending 
plausibility to Hypothesis 2. 
[Table 2 Here] 
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Streeck (2009:187) claims that the intensification of globalization in the 1980s and 
1990s represents nothing fundamentally new in the German political economy. Our account 
suggests otherwise. Export dependence in metalworking plateaued at 50 percent in 1981-
1993 but increased from 52 to 79 percent between 1994 and 2006.20 The decline in West 
German collective bargaining coverage kicked in around the mid-1980s, but it did not start 
in earnest before 1992 or 1995 (Silvia and Schroeder 2007: Figure 1). Our analysis suggests 
that the linkage between exports and wage bargaining helped nurture tension within the 
system starting in the mid-1980s, and that the full-blown effect on institutional change began 
around 1994. In short, the complications booming exports since 1994 generated for the 
stability of industry-wide bargaining has been different in the 1990s-2000s compared to 
earlier periods.21 
 
3.2. Evidence from Establishment Survey 
We test our expectations about the effect of export dependence on enterprise-level 
decision to follow collective agreements using from the IAB Establishment Panel.22 The data 
consists of a representative sample of public and private establishments in Germany, 
capturing the full range of international exposure in an advanced economy. We focus on a 
2002 cross-section of 15,863 establishments, providing a broad cross-section of 
establishments and variables relevant to our argument (Städele and Müller 2006). 
The IAB survey asks about whether establishments follow an industry- or firm-level 
collective agreement. Our measure is a binary variable, as follows: 0=the establishment does 
not follow collective agreements (no industry-level agreement, no company-level 
agreement); 1=the establishment does follow an industry- or company-level collective 
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agreement. Following collective agreements is a stringent measure of collective bargaining 
coverage, involving the negotiation of a collective contract with the union. It varies within 
and across industries. This shows up in the data, where 62 percent of respondent enterprises 
follow collective agreements. The industry with the lowest average is “Legal-accounting-
advertising services” (0.12) and the highest “Public administration” (0.97). 
We generate a measure of industry-level export dependence from OECD data which 
is matched to the respondent’s two-digit sector of employment, using the NACE industry 
classification in the IAB Establishment Panel.23 The measure is Export share, exports as a 
share of sector production. The sample mean is .13, ranging from 0 (“Education”) to 1.17 
(“Manufacture of office machinery and computers”). Export share is lagged one year to take 
into account delays in responses to economic conditions. 
We use foreign sales, the only direct information on international pressure found in 
the IAB-data set, to distinguish between domestic- and export-oriented establishments. 
Foreign sales is defined as exports as a percentage of total sales at the establishment level. 
The sample mean for foreign sales is 8.05, ranging from 0 (for example, enterprises in legal 
and accounting) to 100 (enterprises in electronics). We consider the effects of industry-level 
export dependence, splitting the sample between domestic- and export-oriented enterprises. 
Our yardstick for gauging a firm’s export-orientation is 10 percent of foreign sales. Previous 
research has shown that a large swath of establishments in exporting sectors do either not 
export or have low export intensities (Melitz 2003).24  
Works council is a binary variable, one if the enterprise has a works/staff council and 
zero otherwise. We restrict the sample to firms with five or more employees because German 
labor law stipulates that works councils are authorized in establishments with five or more 
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employees, hence probing potential differentiated effects of the workforce’s choice for or 
against the set-up of a works council under globalization. In the 2002 cross-section, the 
percentage of enterprises with a works council is 46 percent. 
Our analysis captures the large/small firm cleavage by controlling for establishment 
size (measured as total employees). The large/small distinction imperfectly gets at other 
variables and dynamics, including workplace flexibility that is more practicable in large than 
in small firms, technological intensity and economies of scale that reduce unit costs in large 
plants, production relocation that is more extensively used by large firms, and price pressure 
pushed down the production chain by large assemblers onto small suppliers. To further 
capture the different ability to alleviate costs via production relocation among firms, we 
externally code a measure of industry-level outward FDI.25 To the extent that trade and FDI 
are complementary, we expect FDI to more positively (or less negatively) affect the odds to 
follow collective agreements of exporting than of domestic-oriented enterprises. 
Eastern German location should mean fewer collective agreements given the history 
of industrial relations and lower productivity in the East. Skill level measured as the 
proportion of unskilled workers should yield lower incidence of following collective 
agreements, whereas the share of (skilled and unskilled) production workers might under 
modern (just-in-time) production mean increased likelihood of collective agreements. 
Unemployment should be associated with fewer collective agreements.26 Single-
establishment firms (1 if single, 0 if subsidiary or headquarters) ought to negatively relate to 
collective agreement, reflecting how single enterprises tend to be small, less profitable, 
family businesses. New plants (1 if founded since 1990, 0 if older) might be less likely to 
follow collective agreements because they may sweat workers to compensate for 
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disadvantages vis-à-vis learning effects and market visibility. Public ownership (1 if public, 
0 if private) should be positively associated with collective agreements, even though 
differences between public and private sector labor relations have recently decreased. Others 
factors such standard weekly hours, working-time and contract flexibility, productivity, and 
technology might plausibly matter as controls but are excluded from the reported results 
because they are also likely affected by rather than affecting globalization. We consider such 
factors in robustness checks. 
The estimator for the binary variable following collective agreement is probit. Given 
possible unit-level heteroskedasticity and correlation, we estimate standard errors with the 
Huber-White robust-cluster “sandwich” estimator, clustered over the forty-one branches. The 
models consider separately the main and the mediated effects of how export share affects 
establishment-level decision to follow collective agreements, splitting the data into domestic- 
and export-oriented firms. All estimations include ten broad sector dummies, to account for 
unobserved effects of sectors and to address unit-level heteroskedasticity.27 
Table 3 shows the results for the effects of industry-level export share on the incidence 
to follow collective agreements among domestic-oriented and exporting establishments, 
unmediated and mediated by works councils. All controls perform in line with expectations 
and tend to be statistically significant. Most importantly, enterprises with works councils are 
more likely to follow collective agreements, and so are large firms, in line with the large/small 
firm cleavage. Interestingly, outward FDI helps to drive a wedge between domestic- and 
export-oriented firms, given how it more positively and significantly affects the latter. In 
short, it appears that exporting firms also benefit from relocating production abroad. 
[Table 3 Here] 
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Turning to the direct effects of export dependence, industry-level export share is 
negative and statistically significant among domestic-oriented firms (model 1), suggesting 
that higher industry-level export dependence decreases the incidence of collective bargaining 
coverage among domestic-oriented enterprises. Export share is weakly negative but 
statistically insignificant among exporting firms (model 2), implying no direct effect of 
export share on the likelihood to follow collective agreements among exporting firms. These 
results should be interpreted as follows: domestic-oriented enterprises suffer the negative 
consequences of global trade integration that export-oriented firms fuel, such that the latter, 
as the agents of globalization, can be said to indirectly hollow out traditional bargaining 
institutions. We have, thus, evidence of a domestic-/export-oriented firm cleavage and 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
To assess the size of the direct effect requires post-estimation interpretation. We 
calculate the effect of a change in export share on the predicted probability that a domestic-
oriented firm follows collective agreements based on model 1, using Stata’s prvalue program 
and setting the remaining variables to their sample means (Long and Freeze 2005). Moving 
from the 50th through the 90th percentile in the sample distribution of industry-level export 
dependence (from .004 to .388 of export share) yields a decrease from .59 to .51 in the 
probability to follow collective agreements among domestic-oriented establishments. 
Turning to the effects of export dependence conditional on works councils, higher 
export share reduces the incidence of following collective agreements among domestic-
oriented establishments without works councils, shown by the negative and statistically 
significant globalization coefficient in model 3. And moving from having no works council 
to having one moderates the extent to which export share diminishes the incidence of 
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collective agreements among domestic-oriented enterprises, as seen by the positive and 
significant interaction term. In sum, the presence of works councils mutes how industry-level 
export dependence negatively affects collective bargaining coverage among  domestic-
oriented enterprises, in line with Hypothesis 3.28 
The mediating effect is substantially important. Without works councils, moving from 
the sample’s 50th through the 90th percentile in export dependence (from .004 to .388 of export 
share), the model predicts a decrease from .50 to .39 in the probability of following collective 
agreements among domestic-oriented enterprises. With works councils, the same increase in 
export share reduces that probability from .79 to .76. Workplace representation helps 
domestic firms to hold to collective contracts in the face rising exports, albeit without fully 
redressing the negative effect of globalization. 
The results stand up to robustness and sensitivity tests. They are robust to alternate 
measure of the dependent variable, where 1 is given to firms that follow industry-level 
agreements only. They stand up to alternate thresholds delineating exporting from non-
exporting enterprises, including one-fifth and one-third of foreign sales. Restricting the 
sample to tradable sectors yields even stronger results in terms of the size of the key 
coefficients of interest. Including firms with fewer than five employees in the sample leaves 
the main results intact. Step-wise inclusion and exclusion of various controls does not affect 
the results either. For instance, they are similar with inclusion of conditions that we see as 
intervening rather than omitted variables, such as productivity, technology (1 if state-of-the-
art, 0 otherwise), standard weekly hours, and flexibility (for example, incidence of working-
time accounts and/or fixed-term contracts). Finally, alternative estimators and calculations of 
standard errors do not affect the results.  
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4. Conclusion 
We have reported empirical analyses on institutional change in wage bargaining 
related to export orientation in Germany. Based on establishment-level data for a broad range 
of industries and services, we find export dependence of a sector to reduce incidence of 
following collective agreements among domestic-oriented enterprises within that sector but 
to have no effect on exporting firms. We also find that the presence of works councils partly 
redresses the negative effects of globalization on the likelihood of domestic-oriented 
enterprises to hold to collective agreements. When confining our analysis to the pacesetting 
metalworking sector, we find collective wage bargaining to be an intervening link between 
export dependence and institutional change in wage bargaining: while wage settlements 
responded to short-term fluctuations in sector’s export dependence over the period 1984-
2007, protracted export growth adversely affected collective bargaining coverage via higher 
wages over the period 1994-2007. 
We do not wish to overstate the extent to which our argument differs from the CPE 
literature’s variables, but the differences are real and important. Our analysis documents a 
new cleavage between domestic-oriented enterprises and export-oriented firms, in addition 
to the conventional small/large firm cleavage. It helps to clarify competing claims about wage 
developments under openness. Our data on real wage increases in metalworking over four 
decades yields some support for Thelen’s thesis that wage costs as a result of collective wage 
bargaining have grown bigger in recent years. That is, while wage moderation has been a 
constant throughout the period 1971-2007, the extent of wage moderation has decreased in 
time. But in contrast to Thelen, who stresses employers’ loss of the lockout resulting from 
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enhanced interdependence in production and fears of losing market share in case of protracted 
industrial disruption, our explanation of the moderate wage push is rooted in the metal 
industry’s strong export performance. Related to this is a different account of why some firms 
can afford high wage settlements and others cannot: whereas Thelen focuses on the 
differential ability to exploit domestic processes such as the introduction of flexible working-
time arrangements, we stress the differential ability to reap productivity gains associated with 
exporting and export growth. 
Our findings clarify contemporary adjustments of collective bargaining institutions, 
contributing to our understanding of where the unsettling of organized capitalism and labor 
market dualization come from. First, domestic-oriented enterprises have faced the negative 
consequences of increased global integration that export-oriented firms have helped to fuel, 
such that our account focusing on economic globalization does attribute major responsibility 
to the main agents of globalization in hollowing out traditional institutions. Clearly, export-
oriented firms are the “bad guys,” not just the “good guys” involved in a cross-class coalition 
in support of industry-wide bargaining. Second, the new cleavage is as a form of 
insiders/outsiders divide, pitting those who do not work in firms that harness the full power 
of economic globalization (and of export growth in particular) against those who do. This 
suggests that economic globalization is a driver of dualization.  
Our findings also suggest ammunition for globalization-induced convergence, not in 
the sense of institutional identity but of a common neoliberal directionality of change with 
respect to the functioning of institutions. Yet employer coordination appears not to get out of 
the process completely unscathed. The VofC argument about why German employers prefer 
coordination is premised on it being able to sustain export performance in manufacturing. 
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Tangible benefits of coordination include amongst other wage moderation and social peace. 
Regarding the latter, there are two dimensions (Thelen 2000): centralization, by upholding 
the dual system (that is, unions outside, works councils inside the plant) ensures plant-level 
cooperation; and coordination entails a uniform timetable for negotiations across firms 
thereby protecting individual firms from disruptive, isolated wage disputes. Regarding this 
second dimension, in light of recent evidence showing that as a result of globalization 
supplier firms are not immune from deserting employers' associations (Raess 2006; Silvia 
and Schroeder 2007), exporting firms are no longer protected by a same peace obligation 
involving them and their supplier in the value chain.29 This counts as decreasing employer 
capacity to coordinate. It implies diminishing returns to collective bargaining institutions for 
exporting firms, possibly representing the seeds of their future demise and of convergence in 
institutional form.       
Recent CPE scholarship explains conflicts over industrial relations, social policy and 
systems of education and training by stressing difference in preferences between small and 
large employers (Martin 2000; Mares 2003; Culpepper 2007). As economies continue to 
grow more interdependent, the cleavages between domestic- and export-oriented firms and 
sectors are among those differences that shape the destinies of socio-economic institutions 
under capitalism, the recognition of which has the potential to provide further original 
interpretations of past and present battles over policy and institutions. More generally, CPE 
should integrate IPE perspectives more systematically, not just with respect to globalization 
but also to other processes of interdependence such as international policy coordination or 
diffusion (for example, Traxler and Brandl 2009; Gilardi 2010). In any event, to consider 
national models as choices shaped by domestic institutions and actors, as do contemporary 
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theories in CPE and the VofC approach in particular, is no longer tenable. Long live the 
second image reversed (Gourevitch 1978)! 
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TABLE 1.  Export Dependence and Wage Bargaining in Metalworking 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bivariate Baseline Full Baseline-LDV 
 1984-2007 
     
   Exports Cht-2 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.220*** 0.244*** 
 (0.065) (0.059) (0.067) (0.063) 
   Wage increase Cht-1    0.102 
    (0.175) 
   Productivity Ch  0.126 0.094 0.164 
  (0.205) (0.260) (0.218) 
   Unemployment Cht-1  -0.069** -0.059 -0.061* 
  (0.026) (0.034) (0.030) 
   Economic growth Ch   0.004  
   (0.286)  
   Employment Ch   0.057  
   (0.129)  
   Constant 0.908*** 0.794 0.891 0.541 
 (0.268) (0.550) (0.660) (0.706) 
   Observations 24 24 24 24 
   R-squared 0.37 0.56 0.57 0.57 
 
(Notes. Dependent variable: % annual rate of wage change (real wage increase). OLS coefficients with 
standard errors (in parentheses). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Variable 
definition: Exports: % annual change in sector’s export dependence; Productivity: % annual rate of 
productivity change in the economy; Unemployment: % annual change in unemployment rate; Economic 
growth: % annual rate of GDP growth; Employment: % annual change in sector’s employment.) 
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TABLE 2.  Export Dependence and Collective Agreement Coverage in Metalworking  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1994-2007 
     
   Exports Cht-2 -0.293* -0.217 -0.305** -0.291 
 (0.146) (0.223) (0.138) (0.220) 
   Coverage Cht-1   -0.370 -0.364 
   (0.239) (0.259) 
   Wage increase Ch  -0.235  -0.045 
  (0.514)  (0.511) 
   Constant -0.447 -0.399 -0.927 -0.910 
 (0.589) (0.618) (0.637) (0.695) 
   Observations 14 14 14 14 
   R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.39 0.39 
 
(Notes. Dependent variable: % annual change in coverage (West Germany). OLS coefficients with standard 
errors (in parentheses). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Variable definition: 
see Table 1.)
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TABLE 3.  Export Dependence and Following Collective Agreements 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Domestic-
oriented firms 
Exporting 
firms 
Domestic-
oriented firms 
Exporting 
firms 
     
Export sharet-1 -0.547*** -0.058 -0.686*** -0.697** 
 (0.208) (0.230) (0.204) (0.352) 
Works council 0.869*** 1.031*** 0.814*** 0.856*** 
 (0.071) (0.107) (0.083) (0.122) 
Exportst-1*Works Council   0.424** 0.930** 
   (0.182) (0.364) 
Size (1,000) 0.534*** 0.487*** 0.532*** 0.453*** 
 (0.137) (0.112) (0.136) (0.114) 
Outward FDIt-1 0.074 0.389** 0.059 0.414** 
 (0.288) (0.165) (0.294) (0.177) 
Location East Germany -0.425*** -0.150 -0.422*** -0.122 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.101) (0.112) 
Unskilled prop. -0.173 -0.220* -0.176 -0.218* 
 (0.166) (0.122) (0.166) (0.121) 
Production workers prop. 0.542*** 0.308*** 0.539*** 0.292*** 
 (0.167) (0.086) (0.168) (0.092) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.116* -0.126 -0.115* -0.139 
 (0.060) (0.128) (0.060) (0.128) 
Stand-alone firm -0.225** -0.365*** -0.226** -0.365*** 
 (0.091) (0.055) (0.092) (0.055) 
New plant -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.390*** 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.049) (0.067) 
Public ownership 0.861*** 0.545*** 0.877*** 0.558*** 
      (0.121) (0.100) (0.123) (0.095) 
Constant -0.053 0.488*** -0.034 0.573*** 
 (0.220) (0.088) (0.222) (0.101) 
10 industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,652 3,626 6,652 3,626 
Log pseudo-likelihood -3,628.5 -1,585.5 -3,625.8 -1,575.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.29 
 
(Notes. Dependent variable is binary measure of whether establishment follows an industry- or firm-level 
collective bargaining agreement (yes=1; no=0). Threshold domestic- versus export-dependence is foreign 
sales=10%. Probit coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over branch. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.) 
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1 The VofC framework only allows financial globalization to unsettle national institutions mainly because it 
alters corporate finance (Hall and Soskice 2001:60-2).   
2 Strictly speaking, collective bargaining is regional, but the contract negotiated in the pilot district is extended 
in its essentials to all other districts. Regional variations are minor and tend not to relate to yearly wage rises 
(Streeck 1994:120). 
3 Due to convention, organized employers provide identical conditions to union and non-union members. 
4 Collective bargaining in the public sector has long been nationally centralized, but an offensive by 
employers in search of flexibility decentralized bargaining in 2006, resulting in state employees negotiating 
separately from federal and municipal employees (Keller and Kirsch 2011). Behrens and Jacoby (2004) 
document variation in union strategies and flexibility across private sector industries.  
5 We note an evolution in Thelen’s thinking about the nature of the cleavage from her earlier emphasis on firm 
size (Thelen 2000). 
6 Thelen draws on in-depth case analysis of one bargaining round. Silvia and Schroeder’s use of real hourly 
compensation prevents any outright refutation of Thelen’s thesis because comparing wage settlements and 
hourly income is like comparing apples and oranges. We focus on wage settlements because they capture the 
wage floor in collective agreements, which is the relevant measure if one is interested in whether firms follow 
collective agreements. Hourly income is an average for the industry. 
7 Quantitative studies have explored the domestic determinants of collective bargaining coverage (Kohaut and 
Schnabel 2003).  
8 We posit a causal arrow running from exporting to success. An alternative but not mutually exclusive 
hypothesis points to self-selection of the more productive firms into export markets (Melitz 2003). For an 
overview of the theory and evidence of the relationship between exports and productivity, see Wagner (2007). 
We address the possibility of omitted-variable bias by controlling for productivity in robustness checks.  
9 Our account differs from the argument by Swenson and Pontusson (2000) about institutional change in wage 
bargaining in Sweden in two fundamental ways: (i) the outcomes differ, the decline of industry-wide 
collective bargaining coverage versus the de-centralization of national-level wage bargaining; and (ii) the 
domestic-/export-oriented cleavage refers to relations among firms within tradeable sectors (that is, intra-
sectoral cleavages) versus relations across sectors (that is, inter-sectoral cleavage). 
10 Neither does the data permit testing the hypothesis of a split between suppliers and assemblers.   
11 Data source is Gesamtmetall, Tables 29.1 and 29.2, available at 
http://www.gesamtmetall.de/gesamtmetall/meonline.nsf/id/DE_Zeitreihen. Our data ignores some of the 
complexity of wage agreements, such as lump sum payments and other gimmicks (for example, 14 month 
contracts).  
12 Table with annual economic indicators of wage policy over the period 1971-2007 is available upon request. 
13 Our result is consistent with the finding based on hourly compensation data of wage restraint in recent years 
(Mares 2006; Silvia and Schroeder 2007; Carlin and Soskice 2009). It may even be reconciled with Silvia and 
Schroeder’s (2007) finding that changes in mean hourly wages grew smaller over time: widespread 
concession bargaining on non-wage issues at the firm level during the years of intensified globalization might 
well have offset rising costs owing to sectoral wage increases. 
14 We lack comparable data for the 1970s due to a change in industry classification in 1979-1980. 
15 Analysis of material from wage campaigns reveals that whereas the 1992 round took place against the 
background of the 1992-1993 domestic recession, the 1994 round marked a watershed as employers went into 
an unprecedented offensive demanding cuts in costs amidst concerns with international competitiveness.  
16 Our choice of variables and time lags follows how IG Metall thinks about the issues (IG Metall 2001). 
17 I thank one anonymous reviewer for emphasizing to me that the social partners also use quarterly data for 
some economic series. Further study should consider more systematically different lag structures using 
quarterly and/or annual data. 
18 Own calculations based on Gesamtmetall figures.  
19 Our analysis also assumes that the year in which a firm manager decides to leave employers’ association 
coincides with the year of high settlement. This is not necessarily the case because a firm may leave when the 
union announces its wage claim at the onset of a bargaining round.  
20 Own calculations based on statistics from the Federal Statistical Office.  
21 To be clear, those complications emanate from the facts that average export sales grew faster than average 
domestic sales in the recent period and that IG Metall’s wage bargaining strategy targeted the economic 
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conditions in the profitable exporting firms. Weak internal aggregate demand but booming exports that drive 
growth characterize the German economy in recent years (Carlin and Soskice 2009; IG Metall 2001:10). 
22 Remote data access via the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) 
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
23 Data is from “STAN Database for Industrial Analysis” and “Statistics on International Trade in Services.” 
24 Half of German export-oriented manufacturing firms report export-to-production ratios of .15 or lower. And 
the distribution of firms by export intensity has remained stable over time (see Bernard and Wagner 1997). 
25 Outward FDI, the foreign employment of German multinationals in a sector as a proportion of domestic 
employment in that sector, is generated using statistics from OECD’s “STAN Database for Industrial 
Analysis” and Deutsche Bundesbank’s “Foreign Direct Investment Stock Statistics.” Despite the positive 
bivariate association between FDI and export share (coefficient of correlation=.68), including FDI does on the 
whole not pose multicollinearity problems (see below). 
26 Regional unemployment figures are from the Federal Employment Agency. 
27 The ten sector dummies are (i) agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing; (ii) mining, electricity, gas, and water; 
(iii) manufacturing; (iv) construction; (v) trade and repair; (vi) transportation and communication; (vii) 
financial intermediation; (viii) industrial services; (ix) other social services; and (x) public administration. 
Including these does not pose multicollinearity problems with industry-level globalization measures. 
28 Such mediating effect is also apparent among exporting firms (model 4). We don’t elaborate on this result 
because we don’t have particular theoretical expectations, and because this model, and this model alone, 
suffers from multicollinearity (for example, individual VIF score for export share is 5.9). Re-specifying the 
model without FDI yields a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient for export share whereas all 
other coefficients remain similar (results available upon request).  
29 As to whether suppliers have left employers’ associations, our theory predicts a split among domestic-
oriented and exporting suppliers. This begs the question why domestic-oriented suppliers wouldn't benefit 
indirectly from the export success of the assemblers they supply? One reason is that the gains are indirect, in 
the end it is up to the assembler to decide whether to share or not those gains, and it appears they don't.    
